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P R E F A C E 
The f o l l o w i n g r e p o r t provide s s p e c i f i c d e t a i l o f m y communit y 
economic developmen t p r o j e c t . Sinc e l a t e summe r 1982 , I  hav e bee n 
i n t i m a t e l y i n v o l v e d i n e f f o r t s t o s t a b i l i z e a  majo r employe r i n norther n 
Vermont: Vermont Asbesto s Group , Inc . (VAG) . Wel l know n t o th e developmen t 
community sinc e i t s i l l - f a t e d experimen t i n p a r t i a l worker-ownership , th e 
company ha s f a l l e n o n hard s tim e durin g th e l a s t tw o years , an d s t i l l face s 
s e r i o u s o p e r a t i o n a l problems . 
My employer, the Economic Development Council of Northern 
Vermont, Inc . ha s c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t resource s t o a n ongoin g progra m 
aimed a t th e r e t e n t i o n o f th e 17 5 job s t h a t VA G represents . Becaus e o f m y 
d i r e c t an d intens e involvemen t i n t h i s e f f o r t , I  chos e t o us e VA G a s m y CE D 
case study . A  numbe r o f i n d i v i d u a l s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s provide d a s s i s t a n c e 
to t h i s p r o j e c t , bu t Charle s Carte r o f th e Northeaster n Vermon t Developmen t 
A s s o c i a t i o n i n St . Johnsbur y shoul d r e c e i v e s p e c i a l acknowledgement f o r h i s 
t i r e l e s s d e d i c a t i o n t o t h i s cause . 
Throughout this paper, reference is made to the "Council," for it 
was w i t h th e suppor t an d guidanc e o f m y Boar d o f D i r e c t o r s an d Executiv e 
Committee tha t I  wa s abl e t o procee d w i t h th e p r o j e c t . Fo r purpose s o f 
assessment, however , I  hav e i n c l u d e d e x h i b i t s tha t t y p i f y th e typ e o f 
a s s i s t a n c e tha t I  p e r s o n a l l y provide d t o VAG . Th e m a j o r i t y o f th e man y 
plan s , a p p l i c a t i o n s an d report s wer e unde r m y authorship . 
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P r o j e c t H i s t o r y 
In 1974 after twenty years of ownership, the U.S. conglomerate GAF, Inc. 
announced its intention to cease operation of its Lowell, Vermont asbestos mining and 
milling facility. The proposed closing of the mine had a shattering effect upon the 
community since 90% of its commercial tax base and over one hundred jobs were 
inextricably linked to the company. Lowell lies in rural, isolated northeastern 
Vermont, some thirty miles south of the Canadian border. Handicapped by its size, 
location and lack of infrastructure, the community grew up around its natural 
resources: lumber and the highest grade of asbestos ore found in the continental U.S. 
During the twelve months following the GAF announcement, local, state and federal 
officials forged an alliance with local citizens and mine employees to salvage the 
operation. The result of this effort was the formation of the Vermont Asbestos Group, 
Inc. (VAG), a public company with 78% of the stock held by employees and 22% by 
concerned area citizens, and the purchase of the facility from GAF. By Spring 1975, 
VAG was in full production under employee ownership and management. 
While the firm's productivity and profits remained high during the first two 
years under the new management, problems began to surface in 1977. The firm had begun 
an aggressive expansion program including research and development activities which 
drained VAG's capital. Employees, unhappy with their colleague's management began to 
divest themselves of stock, and by the 1978 annual meeting local entrepreneur Howard 
Manosh had acquired sufficient interest to be elected President. Manosh set about 
reorganizing VAG with a focus on developing markets and producing high grade fibers 
in demand by the chemical industry. He also initiated efforts to divest the company 
of its costly research and development subsidiary. As these plans began to take shape 
late in 1980, the asbestos market began a decline which reached serious international 
proportions in 1981. The automobile and construction industries previously had 
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consumed th e m a j o r i t y of the lower grad e asbesto s remove d i n the production of th e 
more expensive "Hooker-1" fiber. With drops in these industries, sales in a dramatic 
slump and sharp reductions in cash flow, VAG was unable to subsidize the removal of 
overburden necessary to reach the Hooker-1 which continued to experience strong 
market demand. 
By December 1981 conditions had worsened to the point that VAG's management 
announced an "indefinite shut-down of operations." A skeleton crew of 
administrative personnel carried on the marketing of existing asbestos stockpiles, 
but the 175 mine and mill workers were laid off. Before the mine reopened in late 
June, most had exhausted their unemployment benefits and were without income. The 
adverse effect of sluggish sales, the subsidization of competition by the Canadian 
federal government and the accompanying favorable exchange rate and the firm's 
inability to invest in the development of its Hooker-1 ore beds left VAG in a 
precarious position. In July, the four small local banks participating in the 
company's financing instituted foreclosure proceedings. 
For the second time in less than a decade, the Town of Lowell was faced with the 
potential loss of its total industrial base. The July 1982 foreclosure announcement 
took the community by surprise. It was generally known that the sales and productions 
levels at the mine were low, but few understood the extent to which the recession and 
adverse sentiment toward the product had damaged the company. In its effort to 
protect the firm, VAG filed countersuits against the banks charging them with 
conspiracy to obtain the company's assets. One hundred seventy-five jobs and a 
community's future hung in the balance. [Exhibit 1] 
The Town of Lowell is a community of 575 people. Like many other small towns in 
northern Vermont, Lowell has experienced a steady decline in its population and tax 
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base sinc e th e t u r n o f th e century . I n the p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g Worl d Wa r I I th e 
community suffered its sharpest decline as residents sought employment in southern 
New England factories. Vermont Asbestos Group represents over 90% of Lowell's current 
commercial tax base. The loss of VAG will mean a direct cost to the Town of $100,000 
in annual property taxes; the company currently is paying only one-half its full rate 
under a tax abatement program designed to carry it through financial restructuring. 
The loss of 175 jobs will mean catastrophic losses of income among Lowell residents 
and those employees living in surrounding towns. In the past two years, many have 
reduced their standard of living because of the instability of VAG employment and the 
inability to find other suitable jobs within commuting distance of their homes. Much 
of the town's housing stock was built following the mine's discovery in the late 
1800's and the average home age is 4-2.5 years. Many of these homes, in addition to 
the essential automobile, are commercially financed and will require continued 
payment with or without the owner's employment. Ironically, many of these residences 
and personal items are financed with the very banks which instituted foreclosure 
against VAG. Adjusted gross income in the community now stands at $3,569 and 
approximately 62% of the local income tax returns report gross wages of less than 
$10,000 per annum. Sixteen percent of the community's population receive food stamps. 
Even with the mine operating at full production levels, unemployment in the area 
averages 11.9% of the labor force. 
The loss of VAG would strike a severe blow to the town; the company's $2.5 
million dollar payroll supports two local grocery stores and a gas station. A variety 
of other commercial services are available in nearby towns, and Morrisville, in 
particular, would be adversely impacted as the regional trading center for clothes, 
fuel, housewares, automobiles, hardware, building supplies and amusements. Since 
new tax burdens would fall on residential property with the closing of VAG, it is 
likely that spending for these items, insofar as possible, would be curtailed. Area 
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businesses hav e t e s t i f i e d i n f o r m a l l y tha t a  s u b s t a n t i a l downtur n i n r e t a il sale s i s 
generally perceived 4-6 weeks following any VAG seasonal closing. In addition,local 
suppliers who serve the company directly with office supplies, tires and automotive 
parts, hardware and tools, mechanical repairs, fuels and numerous other items stand 
to lose nearly $1.5 million in revenues with a shut-down. 
Project Goals 
Details of VAG's imminent closing were circulating in the financial and business 
communities by mid - summer 1982. At their September Board meeting the directors of 
the Economic Development Council (EDC) voted to offer their institutional services to 
assist the company in its effort to remain open. The Council's immediate goal in this 
action was to ensure continued employment for the VAG work force; as a longer range 
objective, the directors hoped to stabilize the company through a program of business 
assistance and financial restructuring. It was with this directive that the EDC staff 
initiated discussions with VAG President Manosh and a number of key management 
personnel and consultants. The result of these discussions was a multi-faceted 
development plan aimed at staving off potential action by creditors and at securing 
additional capital for the company. Five specific components were identified in the 
proposed plan: 
1. Prevention of legal action against the company by its creditors. 
2. Upgrading of the exisitng mining and milling equipment. 
3. Trade assistance against low-priced imports. 
4. Restructuring of the company's existing debt. 
5. Employment diversification. 
Methodology 
The Economi c Developmen t C o u n c i l sough t an d r e c e i v e d th e cooperatio n o f s e v e r a l 
area organizations in implementing its plans for VAG. These included two regional 
planning commissions whose constituents would be affected by a potential closing and 
a local industrial development group consisting primarily of business 
representatives. [Exhibit 2] Unfortunately the Council's action, though responsive, 
was late. By the end of September, the local lending consortium was too deeply 
entrenched in foreclosure proceedings to respond to anything less than dramatic 
action by all parties. The action and resulting countersuit drew attention away from 
vitally needed long range planning and forced a focus on immediate (albeit temporary) 
solutions to prevailing problems. As the key components of the plan evolved, they 
were significantly affected by the looming possibility of immediate shutdown by 
either court action or failing cash flow. 
Cessation of Foreclosure 
All forms of assistance that the Council sought to provide VAG became contingent 
on the cessation of foreclosure action against the company. Thus, it became a number 
one priority to negotiate the withdrawal of action by the lending consortium. 
The Council played a significant part in opening discussions betwen the banks and VAG 
and often served in a mediating role as negotiations proceeded. While these 
negotiations were long and arduous, the time frame may well have been a controlling 
factor in their outcome. During those months, VAG's marketing firm stepped up its 
sales efort and dramatically increased exports. Cash flow improved, new accounts were 
developed and overhead costs were dramatically reduced. These positive indicators 
combined with the community interest expressed by the Council finally brought the 
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n e g o t i a t i o n s t o a  s u c c e s s f u l clos e a f t e r seve n months. Bu t eve n t h i s v i c t o r y wa s 
marred; one of the four participating lending institutions refused to sign the final 
agreement which would provide the lenders with all back interest payments and set 
forth a revised schedule for repayment of existing loans. The bank would settle for 
no less than full payment on its portion of VAG's loan. Without total agreement, the 
consortium had no choice but to return to the courts. The blow was devastating, and 
community groups pressed the "hold-out" bank for a reversal of its decision. A local 
religious leader used his live radio program and monthly newsletter as a forum for 
publicizing the action all to no avail. Anticipating a negative turn of events, 
the remaining lenders purchased the bank's share of the loan, and by July the 
agreement was in effect once again. [Exhibit 3] 
Upgrading of Equipment 
To improve the quality of its product and packaging, VAG's plan included the 
purchase and installation of $1 million in new milling equipment. The Town of Lowell, 
(using Council staff assistance) applied for an Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) 
from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The proposed funds were 
then to be loaned to VAG at a below-market rate for the purchase of equipment. The 
UDAG funds were to be combined with loans from a quasi-public revolving loan fund, a 
state industrial development authority loan and an equity injection by a corporate 
interest. Projections developed by a business consultant familiar with mining 
operatons indicated that the equipment installation could easily support its debt 
service without further drain on the company. Upgrading the mill equipment was 
expected to free existing cash flow for repayment of old debt and to develop new ore 
reserves at the Lowell mine making way for production of high-yield fibers. 
[Exhibit 4J 
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Trade Assistanc e 
One o f th e many problems face d b y VA G wa s th e importin g o f s u b s i d i z e d Canadia n 
asbestos fiber. For many years the Canadian government has been providing grants and 
loans to its asbestos industry thereby allowing significant cost reductions in its 
f i n a l product . Th e C o u n c i l i n s t i t u t e d th e proces s f o r having VA G c e r t i f i e d b y th e 
U.S. government as a firm adversely impacted by foreign imports. Once 
certified (November 1982), the company became eligible for direct technical 
assistance, grants for engineering, research and development, and loan guarantees by 
the Department of Commerce. A diagnostic survey of the company, including marketing, 
finance, management and production, was begun in January 1983 by Commerce Department 
teams. The results of the survey form the basis for future public assistance. 
[Exhibits 5 and 6] 
Debt Restructuring 
VAG's debt structure was a component of the company's problems; a total lack of 
flexibility in its debt capital left the firm unable to respond to inevitable market 
irregularities or to increasing demand for improved product. The proposal to 
restructure debt was the single most encouraging sign for local lenders. The Council 
explored numerous avenues that included (1) loans and guarantees from the Department 
of Commerce, (2) integration of equipment financing with a UDAG, (3) the attraction 
of equity investments by both non-profit and for-profit firms and (4) the injection 
of low interest loans by a local revolving loan fund and the state's industrial 
development authority. This comprehensive financial review was designed in 
cooperation with the Trade Adjustment office and the lending consortium. [Exhibits 7 
and 8 ] 
Job Diversification 
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With th e understandin g tha t th e p h y s i c a l l i f e o f th e VA G or e reserve s i s f i n i t e , 
the proposed recovery program was designed to extend beyond the depletion of 
resources. Reliable estimates indicated that the ore reserves would carry VAG through 
the end of the century at extraction and sales rates projected by the financial 
consultants (roughly equal to present rates). In an effort to plan for eventual 
decline and closing, the community groups reviewed several mechanisms for creating a 
new job base in the Lowell area. These included targeting UDAG repayments toward the 
financing of new employment opportunities in the immediate area, establishing a local 
entrepreneurial program, providing employment re-training and investment in 
speculative development opportunities. 
This plan of action formed the basic methodology under which the project was to 
proceed. It was, in principle, approved by the Vermont Asbestos Group directors, the 
Council's board and the lending institutions and seemed to offer a rational solution 
to a problem that consistently was at the center of controversy. [Exhibit 9] 
Results 
The success of the project have been clouded by recurring problems both within 
VAG and the asbestos industry. Despite fifteen months of concentrated effort, VAG's 
future is no more certain than it was last Fall. The integration of key program 
elements was such that problems with one nearly always affected the others; for 
example, the UDAG application has been withdrawn from consideration on three separate 
occasions. Each time, some other element of the project had encountered problems, and 
each time another cycle of funding (calendar quarter) was missed. Inevitably, when 
local financial commitments were in place, opportunities for public assistance had 
been missed — or the reverse. The foreclosure negotiations cost the project 
considerable time and, quite likely, significant opportunities. The UDAG application 
was submitted for the final time in summer 1983 following the identification of a 
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p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r an d complete d th e propose d package . A t th e same time , th e le n d i n g 
consortium was attempting to resolve its internal foreclosure debate, and the Council 
was unable to certify to HUD that pending legal action would be dropped. VAG, 
pressed for cash, accepted the equity investment. When the foreclosure agreement was 
finally signed, clearing the way for yet another attempt at a UDAG, the company no 
longer could substantiate the needed private investment --- it already had been paid 
in and utilized. The inability to control outside forces proved to be a serious 
detriment to stabilizing the company. By July 1983 the Environmental Protection 
Agency announced that it was speeding up its issuance of regulations pertaining to 
worker exposure to asbestos fiber. While this ruling did not directly affect VAG's 
milling operation (the company is under the regulation of the Mine Safety and Health 
Act), it did severly affect VAG's industrial based clients. The issuance of the new 
regulations and speculation in financial markets about its effect were widely 
publicized. This virtually closed the door on any hope of restructuring the company's 
debt using traditional markets or public assistance. At the same time VAG was deep in 
negotiations with its emplyees' union over a new contract. Facing increasing pressure 
on its domestic sales, management proposed a three to four month winter shut-down 
(traditional) during which time the company would pay only one-half of the employee 
health benefit as a means of cutting operational costs. The union rejected the 
proposal and insisted on 75% company payment. When negotiations broke down in 
November and the workers went on strike, management responded by closing the mine and 
mill for the winter season. To date, no agreement has been reached, and strikers, 
ineligible for unemployment, are living on their own resources supplemented by union 
benefits of $50 weekly. The strike and shut-down have effectively ended any 
possibility of achieving the project objectives in the near future. [Exhibits 10, 11 
and 12] 
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A n a l y s i s 
History does indeed repeat itself; five weeks ago Englehardt Minerals announced 
that it intends to close permanently its talc mining facility in Johnson, Vermont 
sone fifteen miles from VAG. Once again, the community was stirred to action with 
extensive discussion of employee buy-out and public assistance. In this case 75 jobs 
are at stake. The experience at VAG has tempered the Council's response and likely 
will alter the final community reaction to this closing. Several very practical 
conclusions can be drawn from the VAG project: 
Seek practical, obtainable objectives. The Council's effort to stabilize VAG, 
while valiant, was beyond the available resources. Staff time and expertise could not 
cope effectively with the myriad of problems that the company faced. More extensive 
outside assistance, particularly in addressing financial problems, should have been 
obtained. 
Carefully assess external forces. There was within the project a failure to 
assess fully the forces that would impact its success. These ranged from guaging the 
local banking attitudes toward resolution of the problem (ie. reliance on a single 
lead bank for information and direction) to failure in dertermining the potential for 
regulatory intervention. The plan was drawn up with important objectives, but it 
lacked a clear, impartial review of obstacles. 
Define organizational role. Because of the type of assistance provided to VAG, 
the Council became closely alligned with the company's management. However, no 
definitive roles were ever established within this relationship, and it was often 
jolted by the unilateral decisions that businesses make. Maintaining the balance 
between private enterprise and the public sector in a joint project is, at best, 
difficult. Under the conditions at VAG, decisions were made daily that affected 
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proposals befor e numerou s agencies ; withou t c l e a r l i n e s o f a u t h o r i t y , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
and communications, this often resulted in setbacks. Later, when the VAG employees 
called a strike, the Council could not effectively participate in any discussions, 
because it was viewed as an extension of the company management. 
These concepts are now being applied to the Englehardt closing. The Council and 
other organizations are working with both the employees and the owners to find a 
reasonable solution, which in this case is recognized as one that may not include 
continued operation of the mining facility. In retrospect, the Council's efforts at 
VAG might better have been directed at a comprehensive assessment of employment needs 
in the Orleans/Lamoille county area; such a project could have produced substantive 
direction for encouraging, even creating, diversified employment opportunities within 
the region. Facing what now seems to be a slow down and ultimate closing of VAG, the 
community will need assistance in identifying alternative employment opportunities. 
It is not likely that this project will end here, for there is a continuing need in 
Northern Vermont for quality employment; the VAG project will serve as a springboard 
for an onoing community economic development program in which the Economic 
Development Council will be an active partner. 
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